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Abstract
In the last decade neuropsychological insights have gained
influence with regard to age boundaries in legal procedures,
however, in Dutch civil law no such influence can be distin-
guished. Recently, voices have been raised to improve child-
ren’s legal position in civil law: to reflect upon the minimum
age limit of twelve years for children to be invited to be
heard in court and the need for children to have a stronger
procedural position.
In this article, first the current legal position of children in
Dutch law and practice will be analysed. Second, develop-
ment of psychological constructs relevant for family law will
be discussed in relation to underlying brain developmental
processes and contextual effects. These constructs encom-
pass cognitive capacity, autonomy, stress responsiveness
and (peer) pressure.
From the first part it becomes clear that in Dutch family law,
there is a tortuous jungle of age limits, exceptions and limi-
tations regarding children’s procedural rights. Until recently,
the Dutch government has been reluctant to improve the
child’s procedural position in family law. Over the last two
years, however, there has been an inclination towards fur-
ther reflecting on improvements to the child’s procedural
rights, which, from a children’s rights perspective, is an
important step forward. Relevant neuropsychological
insights support improvements for a better realisation of the
child’s right to be heard, such as hearing children younger
than twelve years of age in civil court proceedings.
Keywords: age boundaries, right to be heard, child’s
autonomy, civil proceedings, neuropsychology
1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed the increased influence of
neuropsychological insights on age boundaries in legal
proceedings. In the Netherlands, recent law amend-
ments with regard to the introduction of ‘adolescent
criminal law’ clearly reflect the influence of neuropsy-
chological findings with regard to adolescent brain
development. For instance, based on the well-replicated
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findings that – on average – the brain continues to
mature up until twenty-five years of age,1 young adults
(of eighteen to twenty-three years of age) can be sen-
tenced under criminal law as children based on the per-
sonality of the suspect or the circumstances of the crim-
inal offence.2 Nevertheless, in Dutch civil law, no such
influence can be distinguished.3 In Dutch civil law, dif-
ferent age limits with regard to the participation of chil-
dren in procedures are used, and many different excep-
tions with various age limits can be discerned. Children
lack legal capacity – locus standi – and are no independ-
ent party to the proceedings. Parents or guardians are
responsible to represent them in civil court proceedings,
and when a conflict of interests between the child and
the legal representative(s) can be established, the court
can appoint a guardian ad litem (‘bijzondere curator’) to
represent the child.
Children who experience civil law proceedings are
mostly involved in family law or child protection pro-
ceedings. In such proceedings, tensions often exist
between the interests of parents and child. Recently,
voices have been raised to improve children’s legal posi-
tion in civil law: to reflect upon the age limit of twelve
years for children to be invited to be heard in court and
the need for children to have a stronger procedural posi-
tion.4 This article focuses on children, their current pro-
cedural possibilities in civil law and possible findings to
improve their current position as legally incompetent
parties in civil proceedings concerning children (family
law or child protection proceedings). We aim to answer
the question: to what extent are current age limits for
children in Dutch family law in conformity with neuro-
1. K.L. Mills, A.L. Goddings, M.M. Herting, R. Meuwese, S.J. Blakemore,
E.A. Crone, R.E. Dahl, B. Güroğlu, A. Raznahan, E.R. Sowell & C.K.
Tamnes, ‘Structural Brain Development Between Childhood and Adult-
hood: Convergence Across Four Longitudinal Samples’, 141 Neuro-
image 273 (2016).
2. Art. 77c Dutch Criminal Code.
3. Empirical studies into the neuropsychological development of the ado-
lescent brain can also be useful for reflecting upon the transition from
youth to adulthood at the age of eighteen and legal problems when
transferring from a child protection system for children to a system that
can hardly respond to young adults who are not willing to accept
professional support but who are incapable of living independently
without having serious problems, such as behavioural or psychiatric
problems or substance abuse. Still, in this article we will focus on the
position of children and not on young adults who have experienced
mandatory care and support during their childhood.
4. Government Committee on Reassessment of Parenthood, Child and
Parents in the 21st Century (2016).
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psychological insights? First, the current legal position
of children in Dutch law and practice will be analysed
(section 2). After a brief introduction of the child’s right
to be heard, the child’s right to be heard in family law
proceedings, recommendations for improvement of the
child’s legal position and political unwillingness to act
upon recommendations for Dutch civil law will be dis-
cussed. Furthermore, current age limits for children in
Dutch civil law will be compared with the legal position
of children in other Dutch law contexts. Second, devel-
opment of psychological constructs relevant for family
law will be discussed in relation to underlying brain
developmental processes and contextual effects in chil-
dren (section 3). These constructs encompass cognitive
capacity, autonomy, stress responsiveness and (peer)
pressure. What is known from recent literature on the
development of these neuropsychological processes in
children and – based on these insights – is there a need
for change of their legal position in family law? In the
final part (section 4) of this article, we will address the
question what lessons can be learnt from neuropsycho-
logical insights for Dutch family law.
2 The Current Legal Position
of Children in Dutch Law
and Practice
2.1 The Child’s Right to Be Heard
Children have the right to be heard according to Article
12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (herein-
after CRC), and this includes the right for all children
who are capable of forming their own views to express
those views freely in any judicial proceedings, such as
civil proceedings, ‘either directly, or through a repre-
sentative or an appropriate body’ (Art. 12 section 2
CRC).5 The right to be heard, as enshrined in Article 12
CRC, includes three components: (1) the right to infor-
5. For some critical voices about the still rather vague contents of Art. 12
CRC and Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No.
12. The Right of the Child to be Heard, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/12 (2009),
see e.g. A. Daly, Children, Autonomy and the Courts. Beyond the Right
to be Heard (2018), A. Daly, ‘No Weight for “Due Weight”? A Child-
ren’s Autonomy Principle in Best Interest Proceedings’, 1 International
Journal of Children’s Rights 61 (2018); A. Parkes, Children and Inter-
national Human Rights Law. The Right of the Child to be Heard
(2013), at 120; C.R. Mol, ‘Children’s Representation in Family Law Pro-
ceedings. A Comparative Evaluation in Light of Article 12 of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’, 1 International Journal
of Children’s Rights 66 (2019). From a European perspective, Art. 6
ECHR includes the right of access to court. The right of access to court
is not absolute but may be subject to limitations, for example, for chil-
dren, but these must not restrict or reduce the access in such a way or
to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired (ECtHR
21 February 1075, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1975:0221JUD000445170, Golder v.
UK). The Court has ruled that procedures should be adapted to the
developmental stage of the youth suspect; see A. Daly and S. Rap,
‘Children’s Participation in Youth Justice and Civil Court Proceedings’, in
U. Kilkelly and T. Liefaard (eds.), International Human Rights of Chil-
dren (2018) 299-319. However, the ECtHR has not addressed age limits
with regard to child participation.
mation about being heard, (2) the right to be heard and
(3) the right to be taken seriously by way of their views
being given due weight in accordance with the age and
maturity of the child. In addition to the fact that the
right to be heard is an obligation that arises from the
CRC, a large number of studies show that participation
for children has a number of positive effects.6
The Committee on the Rights of the Child dedicated
their General Comment Number 12 to the child’s right to
be heard and emphasised that
Article 12 imposes no age limit on the right of the
child to express her or his views, and discourages
States parties from introducing age limits either in
law or in practice which would restrict the child’s
right to be heard.7
The Committee on the Rights of the Child acknowledg-
es that some jurisdictions prefer to state an age at which
the child is regarded as capable of expressing his or her
own views – age limits are often used in domestic proce-
dural law. Yet, the Committee assures that, according to
the CRC, children’s capability to express their own
views should be determined on a case-by-case basis and
this requires an individual assessment of each individual
child.8
However, many countries have included age limits that
impede the child’s right to be heard in legal proceed-
ings. The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European
Union looked at statutory provisions in ten member
states of the European Union regarding the child’s right
to be heard in civil cases and found, in 2015, that age
limitations are often incorporated in domestic law with
regard to the child’s right to be heard.9 Furthermore,
differences can be found in the scope of the right to be
heard. In some countries, the right to be heard is limited
to a single interview by a judge, but in other countries,
children have the possibility to present evidence, to
intervene in a case or to receive court rulings.10 Age lim-
its can hinder the child’s right to be heard in legal pro-
ceedings in two ways: absolute age limits that are reflec-
ted in law can restrict children’s participation in legal
proceedings, but also age limits in law can lead to an
interpretation of law that obstructs the child from being
6. S. Rap, D. Verkroost, & M.R. Bruning, ‘Children’s Participation in Dutch
Youth Care Practice: An Exploratory Study into the Opportunities for
Child Participation in Youth Care from Professionals’ Perspective’, 25
Child Care in Practice 37 (2019).
7. Committee on the Rights of the Child, above n. 5, at para. 21.
8. Ibid., at paras. 52 and 102; with regard to health care, the Committee
welcomes the introduction of a fixed age at which the right to consent
transfers to the child, but strongly recommends that where a younger
child can demonstrate capacity to express an informed view on his or
her treatment, this view is given due weight.
9. M.R. Bruning and K.A.M. van der Zon, ‘Can You Hear Me? Children’s
Right to be Heard in Child Protection Proceedings in the Netherlands’,
paper presented at World Congress on Family Law and Children’s
Rights, June 2017, Dublin.
10. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Child-Friendly Justice
– Perspectives and Experiences of Professionals on Children’s Participa-
tion in Civil and Criminal Proceedings in 10 EU Member States (2015),
at 309; Bruning and Van der Zon, above n. 9.
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heard in legal proceedings in practice. In Dutch civil law
and practice, age limits are common. In the next para-
graph, the use of age limits in Dutch civil law and their
implementation in practice will be further discussed.
2.2 Dutch Family Law and Children’s Legal
Position
Under Dutch family law, a child is a person under the
age of eighteen.11 Children lack legal capacity, although
in the past few decades many exceptions to this rule
have been added to the Dutch Civil Code.12 Only their
parents or other legal guardians can initiate civil pro-
ceedings and act as an independent party.13 Parents who
bear parental responsibility are responsible for the
child’s legal representation in civil matters.14 In case of a
conflict of interests between the child and his or her
legal representative (parent or legal guardian), the court
can appoint a guardian ad litem15 (‘bijzondere curator’)
who can represent the child in civil proceedings and
instigate such proceedings. Guardians ad litem in the
Netherlands are usually trained as (family or children’s)
lawyers or as educationalists (behavioural experts). Fur-
thermore, in some family law matters, Dutch law pro-
vides children with the possibility to approach the court
informally and ask for a specific decision. This informal
access to the court is available in matters related to cus-
tody after divorce and contact between a child and a
parent.16
Despite their legal incapacity, children are interested
parties in all family proceedings,17 including proceed-
ings concerning child protection measures such as a
family supervision order. Moreover, they have the right
to be heard in court proceedings if they are twelve years
or older and are not regarded legally incompetent to
express their will.18 Children younger than twelve years
of age can be heard on their request if the court decides
that the child is competent. In this part of our review we
will further elaborate on children’s procedural position
in family law proceedings and the use of related age lim-
its.
2.3 Age Limits in Dutch Civil Law
Although the child’s legal position in family proceedings
was repeatedly debated in society and in parliament in
11. Art. 1:233 Dutch Civil Code (‘Burgerlijk Wetboek’).
12. See M.M. Limbeek and M.R. Bruning, ‘The Netherlands. Two Decades
of the CRC in Dutch Case Law’, in T. Liefaard and J.E. Doek (eds.), Liti-
gating the Rights of the Child. The UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence (2015) 89, at 92-93.
13. Children under the age of twelve do not have the right to access all
files; see Dutch Supreme Court 5 December 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:
2014:3535 and for a critical reflection: T. Liefaard and M.R. Bruning,
‘Commentary on the Judgement of the Hoge Raad on the 5th of
December 2014’, in H. Stalford, K. Hollingsworth and S. Gilmore (eds.),
Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments. From Academic Vision to New
Practice (2017) 173.
14. Art. 1:245(4) Dutch Civil Code.
15. Art. 1:250 Dutch Civil Code.
16. Arts. 1:251a(4) and 1:377g Dutch Civil Code.
17. Art. 798(2) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.
18. Art. 809 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure; see also The Netherlands
Supreme Court, 1 November 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:1084 (annotated
by S.F.M. Wortmann).
the past few decades, the Dutch legislature has time and
again made it clear that there is no reason to change the
concept of legal incapacity of children in family pro-
ceedings. Nevertheless, in Dutch civil law, many excep-
tions to this principle can be distilled.
In Dutch family law, children from the age of sixteen
and older are given some opportunities to initiate pro-
ceedings independently from their legal representatives
in some particular situations. For example, an underage
mother of sixteen years or older who wants to care for
and raise her child under the right to exercise authority
over it, may request the Juvenile Court to be emancipa-
ted.19 She also has legal capacity to act in court and to
appeal against a court decision. A child who has reached
the age of sixteen may request the District Court to be
emancipated, in the sense that certain legal powers of an
adult are granted to him by court order.20 In the court
order decreeing the emancipation, the District Court
explicitly specifies which legal powers of an adult are
awarded to the child. The child may independently act
as plaintiff or defendant in legal proceedings with regard
to matters concerning the emancipation itself and with
regard to juridical acts for which he has obtained full
legal capacity pursuant to his emancipation. This is
mostly used for family business matters in which chil-
dren are participating and, therefore, need to have legal
powers. In matters of adoption, a parent who has not yet
reached the age of legal majority has full legal capacity
to act in legal proceedings.21 Children from sixteen
years of age and older can also initiate proceedings with
regard to changing the registration of sex in their birth
certificate.22 This law amendment of 2014 was inspired
by Article 450 of Book 7 of the Dutch Civil Code, stat-
ing that, for medical treatment, children from the age of
sixteen or older are legally competent to initiate pro-
ceedings. Medical treatment for children between
twelve and sixteen years of age is only possible with
‘double’ informed consent of both parents (as legal rep-
resentatives) and the child, but some exceptions exist to
start medical treatment for this age group without
parents’ consent.23
For children who experience family supervision orders,
exceptions to the legal incapacity of children are also
incorporated in the Dutch Civil Law. Children who are
twelve years of age or older can file requests to the court
with regard to their complaints about the implementa-
tion of the family supervision order, such as a formal
order from the child protection services that are respon-
sible to supervise the child and the family.24 Children
from the age of twelve or older can also request the
court to terminate a family supervision order or an out-
19. Art. 1:253ha Dutch Civil Code.
20. Art. 1:235 Dutch Civil Code.
21. Art. 1:227 sub 6 Dutch Civil Code.
22. This option was introduced for transgender people: Art. 1:28 lid 4
Dutch Civil Code (introduced by law amendment in 2014).
23. Art. 7:450 section 2 Dutch Civil Code. The exception conditions are
‘serious risk for the child’ and ‘without parental consent, the child still
has a strong wish for medical treatment and can oversee the conse-
quences of this decision’.
24. Arts. 1:264 and 265 Dutch Civil Code.
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of-home placement of the child (in alternative care) that
can be ordered in light of a family supervision order.25
Still, these children cannot appeal a family supervision
order without their legal representative since they have
no locus standi.
Another exception to the rule that children are legally
incapacitated in civil proceedings was introduced in
2008, for children who experience secure treatment
(out-of-home) placement. Because a secure treatment
placement involves a serious human rights interference
– a deprivation of the child’s liberty – extra safeguards
were introduced in legislation, and the child who risks
or faces secure treatment placement is deemed legally
competent to independently start legal proceedings or
appeal a decision.26 In secure treatment placement pro-
ceedings, children are an independent party to the pro-
ceedings, have locus standi and are represented by a law-
yer.27
Besides direct autonomous access to court proceedings,
the Dutch Civil Code offers children who are twelve
years or older the possibility to informally contact the
court in the context of divorce proceedings and request
that joint parental authority be converted to sole paren-
tal authority or to bring a case with respect to access
rights or care plans subsequent to divorce.28 Children
from the age of twelve and older can informally contact
the court (e.g. by writing a letter or sending an email)
without (legal) representation. Children younger than
the age of twelve who are considered as competent can
also use this opportunity.29 The court has discretionary
power to decide about the child’s request. No man-
datory duty to hear the child in court or to give a formal
legal decision exists. The child is not competent to
autonomously appeal any decision in this context but
can only appeal through his or her legal representa-
tive(s) or guardian ad litem30 In practice, children’s use
of this ‘informal access’ to court remains trivial.31
Children can also request the court to appoint a guardi-
an ad litem when there is a conflict of interests between
the child and his or her parents or guardian as legal rep-
resentatives in any matter about the upbringing and
education of the child.32 The court can appoint a guard-
25. Art. 1: 265d Dutch Civil Code.
26. Art. 6.1.1(2) Dutch Youth Act (‘Jeugdwet’); children from twelve years
and older are independent parties to the proceedings with legal capaci-
ty, and children younger than twelve years have the same legal position
when they are deemed competent.
27. Art. 6.1.1 section 2 Dutch Youth Act.
28. Arts. 1:251a section 4, 1:377g & 1:253a section 4 Dutch Civil Code.
29. This expansion for children younger than twelve years of age was intro-
duced in 1995 by law amendment (see Wet van 6 April 1995 tot
nadere regeling van het gezag over en van de omgang met minder-
jarige kinderen (1995)).
30. Dutch Supreme Court 29 May 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1409.
31. M.H.L. Van den Hoogen and P.J. Montanus, ‘Hoe staat het anno 2017
met de informele rechtsingang?’, 11 FJR 286 (2017).
32. See e.g. I.J. Pieters, ‘De bijzondere curator: Quo vadis?’, 9 FJR 180
(2008); I.J. Pieters, ‘Waar staat de bijzondere curator in het huidige
rechtsbestel inmiddels?’, 4 FJR 97 (2012); I.J. Pieters, ‘De groeistuipen
van de bijzondere curator’, 6 FJR 177 (2017); G.W. Brands-Bottema,
‘De bijzondere curator: nieuwe ontwikkelingen’, 10 EB Tijdschrift voor
ian ad litem ex officio. The child can also request the
appointment of a guardian ad litem. When the judge
rejects the request to appoint a guardian ad litem, the
child can appeal with the support of a legal representa-
tive.33 A significant increase in the number of appointed
guardian ad litems has been visible in the last decade.
Furthermore, a development of further professionalisa-
tion occurred and judges have become more acquainted
with the possibility to appoint a guardian ad litem for
children.34 Nevertheless, judges do not always appoint a
guardian ad litem on request. When, for example, the
child’s interests are represented by his or her parents,
child protection services or a social worker who is
responsible for a child protection order, judges are
reluctant to appoint a guardian ad litem35 In legal
parentage proceedings with children involved, judges
will always have to appoint a guardian ad litem (ex offi-
cio) to represent the child.36 The court has no discre-
tionary power in such proceedings.
As was mentioned, children from the age of twelve years
or older must be given the opportunity to be heard in
civil court proceedings and are invited for a court hear-
ing.37 Only in child alimony proceedings, the age limit
to invite children to be heard in court is sixteen years of
age.38 The court has discretionary power to hear chil-
dren younger than twelve years of age on their request
when they are deemed competent. This group of chil-
dren do not have the right to be heard since their being
heard is left to the discretionary power of the court.
Thus, children under the age of twelve are not automat-
ically invited to participate in the court procedure and
need to take action if they want to be heard in court. In
practice, children under the age of twelve are rarely
heard in family law proceedings.39
Scheidingsrecht 183 (2018); C.A.R.M. van Leuven and I.J. Pieters,
‘Stichting bijzondere curator Nederland’, 3 Relatierecht en Praktijk 39
(2018).
33. Dutch Supreme Court 3 February 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:158.
34. A Guardian ad litem Foundation has been established, see van Leuven
and Pieters, above n. 32. Moreover, professional standards have been
developed (see Landelijk Overleg Vakinhoud Familie – en Jeugdrecht
(LOVF), Werkproces benoeming bijzondere curator op grond van art.
1:250 BW,www.rechtspraak.nl; Leidraad werkwijze en verslag bijzon-
dere curatoren ex art. 1:250 BW and Richtlijn Benoeming Bijzondere
Curator o.g.v. art. 1:212 BW).
35. M.R. Bruning, et al., Kind in proces: van communicatie naar effectieve
participatie (WODC-onderzoek) Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers
(2020), at 47-50; M.M.C. Limbeek, ‘De bijzondere curator: een vol-
waardig sluitstuk van rechtsbescherming?’, in J.H. de Graaf, C. Mak,
P.J. Montanus & F.K. van Wijk (eds.), Rechten van het Kind en Waar-
digheid (2013) 199; M.R. Bruning, ‘Versterking van de procedurele
positie van de minderjarige in het jeugdbeschermingsrecht – een brug te
ver?’, in W.H. van Boom et al. (eds.), Een kwart eeuw Privaatrechtelijke
opstellen, aangeboden aan prof. mr. H.J. Snijders ter gelegenheid van
zijn emeritaat (2016) 75.
36. Art. 1:212 Dutch Civil Code. See also the relevant court guidelines
(Richtlijn benoeming bijzondere curator o.g.v. artikel 1:212
BW,www.rechtspraak.nl).
37. Art. 1:809 section 1 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.
38. Art. 1:809 lid 1 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.
39. Bruning et al., above n. 35, at 226; K.A.M. van der Zon and M.P. De
Jong-de Kruijf, ‘Hoger beroep tegen een uithuisplaatsingsbeslissing en
de rol van de minderjarige’, TREMA Tijdschrift voor de rechterlijke
macht (2015), at 307; H.C.M. Aalders, ‘De rechtspraktijk inzake
34
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For children twelve years or older, in the Dutch Code of
Civil Procedure judges are given the opportunity to not
hear these children only when it concerns a case of mini-
mal relevance to the child. The Dutch legislator has
underlined that when it is plausible that the child does
not want to be heard, the judge is not obliged to hear the
child.40 The same applies for children who are unable to
be heard due to a physical or mental health problem.41 A
last exception to the rule to hear every child of twelve
years of age and older concerns the situation in which
the judge fears that hearing the child will negatively
influence the child’s health and development.42
Courts and judges are not given any conditions or blue-
print in legislation on how to hear the child in court.
The Dutch Code of Civil Procedure remains silent
about the way children should be heard in civil law pro-
ceedings. In 2015, the Courts of Appeal developed a
professional standard of how the child should be
heard.43
2.4 Age Limits in Other Dutch Legal Contexts
In other Dutch legal contexts, children’s procedural
rights are different. In criminal law, child suspects from
the age of sixteen or older are given the same rights as
adult suspects; in other words, they are seen as an inde-
pendent party to the criminal proceedings. They can,
for example, question witnesses.44 Children are repre-
sented by a lawyer in criminal proceedings, and the law-
yer can also independently execute the child’s rights
when the child is younger than sixteen years of age,45
such as to initiate appeal proceedings.
In administrative law, no age limits are used with regard
to the position of children. Children can independently
start proceedings when they are considered competent
to oversee the consequences of their decisions.46 The
court will assess the child’s competency in light of the
individual circumstances of the case. The Youth Act
2015, a specific administrative legal act for all forms of
support and care for children and families, encompasses
a similar approach, and all children who are considered
competent can initiate court proceedings, for example,
to contest a decision of an administrative body in
response to a request for youth care and support. These
children can also independently appeal court decisions.
The only exception to this individualised approach to
children’s procedural rights in administrative law, as
mentioned, involves decisions in light of secure treat-
gezagsbeëindiging vanuit kinderrechtelijk perspectief’, 11 FJR
(2018/63), at 66.
40. Dutch Parliamentary Documents II 1992-93, 22487, 6, at 16; see also
Dutch Supreme Court, 1 November 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:1084.
41. Dutch Parliamentary Documents II 1991-92, 22487, 3, at 10.
42. Dutch Supreme Court, 1 November 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:1084
(annotated by S.F.M. Wortmann).
43. See Professionele standaard kindgesprekken 9 December 2016,
www.rechtspraak.nl. In practice, a child hearing in chambers lasts
between 7, 5 and 19 minutes in Court of Appeal proceedings about
out-of-home placement of children; Van der Zon and De Jong-de Kruijf,
above n. 39.
44. Art. 292 section 3 Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.
45. Art. 503 section 1 Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.
46. Art. 8:21 section 2 Dutch General Administrative Law Act.
ment placements of children that are covered by the
Youth Act 2015. Since this particular situation of secure
treatment placement is closely connected to other out-
of-home placements of children in alternative care as
part of child protection, regulated in the Dutch Civil
Code,47 the age limit of twelve years of age that is
adopted in civil law is used.
It has, thus, become clear that in different law regimes
the procedural position of children varies and both age
limits and an individualised competency test are used. It
seems like different Dutch legal contexts envisage
diverse child images with differing consideration of the
child’s evolving capacities and competency.48
2.5 Political (Un)willingness to Improve the
Child’s Legal Position
It can be concluded that the legal position of children in
Dutch civil law is rather complex and fragmented and
also differs from the child’s position in other Dutch
legal contexts. Over the past few decades several excep-
tions to the child legal incapability have been introduced
in legislation, with various aims and motivations,49 but
this has only led to a more complicated system with
regard to the legal position of children, a system that
includes so many exceptions to the rule of legal incapac-
ity. In the Dutch civil law system, children are no inde-
pendent parties and cannot instigate proceedings and
appeal against decisions.
In recent history, several voices have been raised to
encourage the Dutch legislature to improve children’s
position in civil proceedings, often based on research
findings.50 According to the Dutch legislature, the
child’s best interests will be sufficiently represented by
his parents or other legal guardians in most situations.
When the child’s interests conflict with the interests of
his legal representative (parent or legal guardian) and
this causes a serious conflict of interests, for example,
with regard to the education and upbringing of the
child, access to court is guaranteed via the appointment
of a guardian ad litem; this legal possibility is considered
sufficient by the legislator.51 In 1991, with regard to
legal reform of family procedures, the legislator con-
firmed that children do not and should not have the
legal capacity to initiate family proceedings. Children
are not legal parties to proceedings and need to be rep-
resented by their parents or other legal guardians or by a
guardian ad litem.52 In order to strengthen the legal
47. Art. 1:262b Dutch Civil Code.
48. Bruning et al., above n. 35, at 68.
49. Ibid., at 30-38.
50. See e.g. Dutch Parliamentary Documents II 1989-90, 21309, 2 (Notitie
rechtspositie minderjarigen); Raad voor het Jeugdbeleid en Nederlandse
Gezinsraad (1995); Dutch Parliamentary Documents II 1991-92, 21487,
3 at 7 (MvT); Dutch Parliamentary Documents II 2003-04, 29200 VI,
116, at 3; M.J. Steketee, A.M. Overgaag & D. Lünneman, Minderjari-
gen als procespartij? Een onderzoek naar de bijzondere curator en for-
mele rechtsingang voor minderjarigen (2003).
51. M.R. Bruning and T. Liefaard, ‘The Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge
Raad)’, in H. Stalford, K. Hollingsworth and S. Gilmore (eds.), Rewriting
Children’s Rights Judgements. From Academic Vision to New Practice
(2017) 182, at 184.
52. Ibid.
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position of children in civil proceedings, the legislator
clarified to have chosen to improve the child’s possibili-
ties to be represented by a guardian ad litem in cases
where the child’s best interests cannot be represented by
a parent or other legal guardian, for example, in the
situation of a conflict of interests.53 The legislator
emphasised that the lack of an independent procedural
position does not constitute a violation of Article 6 of
the European Convention of Human Rights (guarantee-
ing access to an impartial tribunal) since the European
Court on Human Rights has accepted the vulnerable
position of children as a legitimised interference of this
fundamental right.54
In 2003, in response to recommendations of a research
project, commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Justice,
focused on the legal position of children in civil pro-
ceedings,55 the legislator again took the same position in
response to a research report focused on improvements
of the legal position of children and the guardian ad
litem. The legislator stated that the current possibilities
of representation by a guardian ad litem when there is a
conflict of interests between the child and his parents or
other legal guardians were sufficient and it was unneces-
sary to introduce an independent legal position in civil
proceedings for children.56 According to the legislator,
the current system in which parents or other legal
guardians represent their child, unless there is a conflict
of interest, sufficed. That is, the child’s legal position
did not need to be strengthened and was sufficiently
protected.57 The Ministry of Justice voiced a similar
response to a research report of the Dutch Children’s
Ombudsman about the child’s guardian ad litem in 2012.
It was stated that the legal possibility to appoint a
guardian ad litem is sufficient to guarantee the child’s
best interests, since the court has wide discretionary
scope to appoint such a representative. A ‘serious con-
flict of interests’ needed for the court appointment of a
guardian ad litem should, according to the legislator, not
need to be interpreted strictly, like case law had shown,
but could be widely interpreted.58 Not only when
parents and their child obviously have direct conflicting
interests, but also when parents are incapable of over-
seeing the issues concerning the child or of sufficiently
representing these issues, one could speak of a ‘serious
conflict of interests’ that requires the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.59 This means that the threshold for a
court appointment of a guardian ad litem should be con-
sidered low. For instance, according to the legislator
divorce or separation conflicts between two ex-partners
could yet lead to the assumption of such a ‘serious con-
53. Dutch Parliamentary Documents II 1991/92, 22487, 3, at 7.
54. Dutch Parliamentary Documents II 1989/90, 21309, 2, at 21 (Notitie
rechtspositie minderjarigen).
55. Steketee et al., above n. 50.
56. Bruning and Liefaard, above n. 51, at 184.
57. Parliamentary Documents II 2003/04, 29200 VI, nr. 116, at 3.
58. Parliamentary Documents II 2012/13, 31 753, nr. 56.
59. Bruning and Liefaard, above n. 51, at 185.
flict of interests’ and, thus, lead to the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for the child.60
The Dutch Government Committee on Reassessment of
Parenthood reflected in its report of 2016 on the current
statutory framework for hearing children and concluded
that there are few objective arguments that can be prof-
fered for a specific age limit of twelve years.61 The Gov-
ernment Committee was of the opinion that, on the one
hand,
the hearing of children should preferably not be
linked to a pre-determined age-limit, but instead
should be determined on a case-by-case basis … On
the other hand, the Government Committee under-
stands the need from a practical point of view to have
clear age limits, from which a child should be
heard.62
According to the Government Committee, children
from the age of eight should have the right to be heard
in procedures related to parentage and custody.
Although the age limit of eight years is obviously equal-
ly arbitrary, the Committee believes that, in general, a
child from this age can be presumed to be able to under-
stand what decisions in the field of parentage and custo-
dy will mean, provided that they are explained to him or
her. The Committee, therefore, recommended in 2016
that children from the age of eight should be granted the
opportunity to be heard in procedures regarding parent-
age and custody and advised that the right of children to
be heard should be placed in the context of a broader
reflection of the position of children in Dutch procedur-
al law. Furthermore, the Committee advised that the
possibility of creating a formal procedure for children to
bring a case to court should be examined.63 The Dutch
government endorsed these recommendations in its coa-
lition agreement of 2017,64 and in 2018, the Minister of
Legal Protection announced that further research will
be initiated.65
60. Ibid.
61. The Wiarda Commission argued in 1971 that the age limit of twelve
corresponds to the moment that occurs in the life of every Dutch child
when they move from primary to secondary school, and referenced to
the criminal age of responsibility that is linked to twelve; see Commissie
voor de herziening van het Kinderbeschermingsrecht, Jeugdbescher-
mingsrecht (1971), at 63.
62. Government Committee on Reassessment of Parenthood, above n. 4, at
27 and 28.
63. Ibid., at 28. According to the Committee, a formal procedure for chil-
dren to bring a case would have the important advantage of providing
the child with a formal position within the proceedings. The child would
no longer be dependent upon the willingness of the court to honour an
informal request of the child. At the same time, the Committee
acknowledges that a formal procedure for children to bring a case to
court also widens the scope for parents to bring cases to court through
their child instead of in their own name, an undesirable situation.
64. Coalition Agreement 2017-2021, Vertrouwen in de toekomst (2017), at
6.
65. Letter of Dutch Minister of Legal Protection of 22 March 2018 (‘Nadere
invulling onderzoeken op het terrein van het familierecht’). This article
is based on some of the findings of this research released in 2020, Brun-
ing et al., above n. 35.
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In this part of our review it has been made clear that in
Dutch family law a tortuous jungle of age limits, excep-
tions and limitations regarding children’s procedural
rights has developed in the past few decades. In other
Dutch legal contexts, different choices have been made
and children’s procedural position differs. Until recent-
ly, the Dutch government has been reluctant to improve
the child’s procedural position in family law, although
in the last two years, the endorsement of the aforemen-
tioned recommendations of the Government Committee
to further reflect on improvements to the child’s proce-
dural rights shows an opening and willingness that is an
important step forward from a children’s rights perspec-
tive.
In the next part, relevant neuropsychological insights
will be presented. Moreover, it will be discussed what
lessons can be learnt from these insights when reflecting
upon age limits and the child’s right to be heard and to
initiate proceedings.
3 Neuropsychological Insights
3.1 Neuropsychological Insights and the Child’s
Right to Be Heard
In the first part of this review, it is mentioned that,
according to Article 12 CRC, children have the right to
be heard, and this includes the right for all children who
are capable of forming their own views to express those
views freely in any judicial proceedings, such as civil
proceedings. The right to be heard as enshrined in Art-
icle 12 CRC includes three components: the right to
information about being heard (1), the right to be heard
(2) and the right to be taken seriously by way of their
views being given due weight in accordance with the age
and maturity of the child.
In order to effectively implement these components of
Article 12 CRC, neuropsychological insights with
regard to the child’s development are crucial. In partic-
ular, developmental insights regarding the child’s capa-
bility and maturity and resistance to possible influence
or manipulation of the child’s opinion. Furthermore, it
is vital to have insight into the relevance for the child to
be taken seriously by way of giving due weight to his or
her views.
If we want to understand what children are capable of at
a certain age, it is important to gain more insight into
milestones and biological transition phases that affect
cognitive and emotional processes. Such an important
transition phase is adolescence – roughly spanning from
age ten to age twenty-three – which entails the process
of growing up from a child into becoming an adult
member of society. Adolescence starts with the onset of
puberty, a hormonal process that is related to brain
development and emotional processing66 and already
66. J.S. Peper and R.E. Dahl, ‘Surging Hormones: Brain-Behavior Interac-
tions During Puberty’, 22 Current Directions in Psychological Science
134 (2013).
starts – on average – at age eight in girls and nine in boys67
As hormonal changes during puberty affect brain
regions involved in affective processing (including emo-
tion regulation, stress responsiveness and decision mak-
ing under risk and uncertainty), it is important to recog-
nise that these developmental effects are initiated way
before the age of twelve.
Scientific studies into large-scale normative brain devel-
opment are accumulating, using state-of-the-art neuroi-
maging techniques.68 Especially, longitudinal studies are
informative when it comes to disentangling develop-
mental effects from individual variation in brain and
behavioural change.69
Developmental neuropsychology offers starting points
for determining and reconsidering the legal position of
children. For example, a recent publication by Groo-
tens-Wiegers, Hein and colleagues examined neuro-
scientific mechanisms that may be relevant to the
capacities of children in making medical decisions.70
Neuroscientific insights also have been applied in ado-
lescent criminal law: the age limit in adolescent criminal
law can be extended to twenty-three years, taking into
account individual characteristics, based on the now
widely replicated finding that brain development has
not yet been completed with eighteen years, but extends
on average to around twenty-three years.71 Although
there have been reflections on the age limits on the right
to be heard and the legal capacity to initiate family pro-
ceedings,72 current insights from developmental neuro-
psychology have not yet been included in determining
the procedural position of children within family law.
As opposed to adolescent criminal law, this article is
intended to reflect on the lower age limit of the right to
be heard and legal capacities to initiate family proceed-
ings. Developmental brain imaging studies are usually
carried out from eight years onward (up to twenty-five
67. M.E.A. Barendse, J.G. Simmons, M.L. Byrne, M.L. Steal, G. Patton,
L. Mundy, S.J. Wood, C.A. Olsson & S. Whittle, ‘Brain Structural Con-
nectivity During Adrenarche: Associations Between Hormone Levels and
White Matter Microstructure’, 88 Psychoneuroendocrinology 70
(2018).
68. E.A. Crone and R.E. Dahl, ‘Understanding Adolescence as a Period of
Social-Affective Engagement and Goal Flexibility’, 13 Nature Reviews
Neuroscience 636 (2012); B.J. Casey, A. Galvan & L.H. Somerville,
‘Beyond Simple Models of Adolescence to an Integrated Circuit-Based
Account: A Commentary’, 17 Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience
128 (2016); A.R. Smith, J. Chein & L. Steinberg, ‘Impact of Socio-Emo-
tional Context, Brain Development, and Pubertal Maturation on Adoles-
cent Risk-Taking’, 64 Hormones and Behavior 323 (2013); C.K.
Tamnes, M.M. Hertig, A.L. Goddings, R. Meuwese, S.J. Blakemore, R.E.
Dahl, B. Güroğlu, A. Raznahan, E.R. Sowell, E.A. Crone & K.L. Mills,
‘Development of the Cerebral Cortex Across Adolescence: A Multisam-
ple Study of Inter-Related Longitudinal Changes in Cortical Volume,
Surface Area, and Thickness’, 37 Journal of Neuroscience 3402 (2017).
69. Mills et al., above n. 1.
70. P. Grootens-Wiegers, I.M. Hein, J.M. van den Broek & M.C. de Vries,
‘Medical Decision-Making in Children and Adolescents: Developmental
and Neuroscientific Aspects’, 17 BMC Pediatrics 120 (2017).
71. Tamnes et al., above n. 68; Mills et al., above n. 1; C. Lebel, L. Walker,
A. Leemans, L. Phillips & C. Beaulieu, ‘Microstructural Maturation of the
Human Brain from Childhood to Adulthood’, 40 Neuroimage 1044
(2008).
72. C.C.M. van Leeuwen, ‘Het hoorrecht in het civiele jeugdrecht gaat over
grenzen’, 10 FJR 260 (2017); Rap et al., above n. 6.
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years of age), spanning late childhood and adolescence.
Therefore, in this part, an overview is first provided on
the general patterns of brain development across late
childhood and (early) adolescence, to obtain a broad
sense of anatomical and functional brain changes occur-
ring in this phase of development. This knowledge is
relevant in guiding the interpretation of behaviour, cog-
nitions and emotions based on the (neuro)psychological
development. In other words, What can be expected
from children within a certain developmental period?
This is followed by a section on the development of lan-
guage, perspective taking and executive functions.
These are neurocognitive capacities that are relevant for
(family) law, such as the capability to form and express
an own view (which is not purely dependent on cogni-
tive systems, though, but is also influenced by emotions
and theory of mind skills). Finally, development of the
psychological constructs autonomy, stress responsive-
ness and (peer) pressure are discussed in relation to the
civil law context.
3.2 Brain Development from Late Childhood
into (Early) Adolescence
With the development of sophisticated neuroimaging
techniques over the last twenty years, it has become pos-
sible to study changes in the living brain. We will first
briefly summarise current research on structural and
functional brain changes taking place during the transi-
tion from childhood into adolescence.
This summary relies on the most recent evidence avail-
able and is not intended to be an exhaustive review of
the literature; moreover, studies tend to use ‘typically’
developing adolescents, which limits our ability to com-
ment on whether or how these processes may change for
young people with developmental delays or across a
broader spectrum of neurodiversity.
With structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), it
has been found that changes occur in the brain’s grey
and white matter across childhood and adolescence.
Grey matter includes the cerebral and subcortical brain
structures and is, among others, composed of neuronal
bodies, synapses (i.e. the site of transmission of electric
nerve impulses between two nerve cells), glial cells (i.e.
the cells that surround neurons and provide support for
and insulation between them), dendrites and blood ves-
sels. White matter largely comprises big, organised
myelinated axons that connect grey matter brain
regions.73
It has been shown that at six years of age, total brain
volume already reaches 95% of its adult size.74 Then,
total brain volume peaks around ten years of age, fol-
lowed by a gradual decrease.75 This developmental pat-
tern of total brain volume is strikingly similar between
73. P.R. Huttenlocher, ‘Morphometric Study of Human Cerebral Cortex
Development’, 28 Neuropsychologia 6 (1990).
74. J.N. Giedd, A. Raznahan, A. Alexander-Bloch, E. Schmitt, N. Gogtay &
J.L. Rapoport, ‘Child Psychiatry Branch of the National Institute of Men-
tal Health Longitudinal Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study
of Human Brain Development’, 40 Neuropsychopharmacology 1
(2015).
75. Mills et al., above n. 1.
boys and girls76 and invalidates claims that brain devel-
opment in boys is delayed as opposed to that in girls.
Researchers found that grey matter volume was highest
in childhood, decreased across early and middle adoles-
cence and began to stabilise in the early twenties; this
pattern held even after accounting for intracranial and
whole brain volume. Additional studies of cortical vol-
ume have also documented the highest levels occurring
in childhood, with decreases from late childhood
throughout adolescence – the decrease appearing to be
due to the thinning of the cortex.77 For white matter
volume, on the other hand, researchers found that,
across samples, increases in white matter volume occur-
red from childhood through mid-adolescence and
showed some stabilising in late adolescence. Some neu-
ral circuitry, consisting of networks of synaptic connec-
tions, is extremely malleable during adolescence, as con-
nections form and reform in response to a variety of
novel experiences and stressors.78
Next to these ‘global’ changes in gross morphology,
regional developmental changes in brain areas and their
interconnections have been reported as well.79 Theoreti-
cal models have emerged to explain how regional neuro-
biological changes map onto cognitive and emotional
development from childhood into adolescence. Two of
the often used models are the ‘dual systems’ model and
the ‘imbalance’ model. The dual systems model80
describes the product of a developmental asynchrony
between a quickly aroused reward system (the ventral
striatum), which inclines adolescents toward sensation
seeking, and still maturing self-regulatory regions (i.e.
the prefrontal cortex (PFC)), which limit the young per-
son’s ability to resist these inclinations.81
The ‘reward system’ references subcortical structures,
while the ‘self-regulatory regions’ refer to areas like the
PFC.
The imbalance model shifts the focus away from an
orthogonal, dual systems account and instead emphasi-
ses patterns of change in neural circuitry across adoles-
76. L.M. Wierenga, M. Langen, B. Oranje & S. Durston, ‘Unique Develop-
mental Trajectories of Cortical Thickness and Surface Area’, 15 Neuro-
image 87 (2014).
77. Tamnes et al., above n. 68.
78. F.Y. Ismail, A. Fatemi & M.V. Johnston, ‘Cerebral Plasticity: Windows of
Opportunity in the Developing Brain’, 21 European Journal of Paediat-
ric Neurology 1 (2017); L.D. Selemon, ‘A Role for Synaptic Plasticity in
the Adolescent Development of Executive Function’, 5 Translational
Psychiatry 3 (2013).
79. Tamnes et al., above n. 68; A.C.K. van Duijvenvoorde, B. Westhoff,
F. de Vos, L.M. Wierenga & E.A. Crone, ‘A Three-Wave Longitudinal
Study of Subcortical-Cortical Resting-State Connectivity in Adolescence:
Testing Age- and Puberty-Related Changes’, 40 Human Brain Mapping
13 (2019).
80. E.P. Shulman, A.R. Smith, K. Silva, G. Icenogle, N. Duell, J. Chein &
L. Steinberg, ‘The Dual Systems Model: Review, Reappraisal, and Reaf-
firmation’, 17 Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience (2016); L. Stein-
berg, ‘A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking’, 28
Developmental Reviews 1 (2008).
81. L. Sherman, L. Steinberg & J. Chein, ‘Connecting Brain Responsivity and
Real-World Risk Taking: Strengths and Limitations of Current Method-
ological Approaches’, 33; 27-41 Developmental Cognitive Neuro-
science (2018).
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cence. This fine-tuning of circuits is hypothesised to
occur in a cascading fashion, beginning within subcorti-
cal regions (such as those within the limbic system),
then strengthening across regions and, finally, occurring
within outer areas of the brain like the PFC.82 This
model corresponds with observed behavioural and emo-
tional regulation – over time, most adolescents become
more goal oriented and purposeful, and less impulsive.83
Irrespective of the differences between the two models
of brain development and the relation to behaviour, they
both converge on the point that fundamental areas of
the brain undergo asynchronous development from
childhood into adolescence. That is, adolescent behav-
iour, especially concerning increased risk taking and
still-developing self-control, has been particularly
attributed to asynchronous development within and
between the subcortical and cortical regions of the brain.
The former drives emotion, and the latter acts as the
control centre for long-term planning, consideration of
outcomes and regulation of behaviour.84 Thus, if con-
nections within the limbic system develop faster than
those within and between the PFC region, the imbal-
ance may favour a tendency towards heightened sensi-
tivity to peer influence, impulsivity, risk-taking beha-
viours and emotional instability.85
3.3 Neurocognitive Capacities
To obtain realistic predictions about the cognitive
capacities needed to weigh different arguments, form an
opinion, make a decision and oversee the consequences
of that decision, it is important to get insights into the
general developmental patterns of the underlying neuro-
cognitive systems. All of these steps are directly relevant
when reflecting on age boundaries within civil (family)
law. Here, the development of cognitive capacities
needed to form and express an (own) view will be high-
lighted, as well as the cognitive capacities needed to ini-
tiate proceedings.
On the level of language development (i.e. understand-
ing of sentences and subsequent speech production), it
has been demonstrated that the development of under-
standing and producing complex (i.e. multi-clause) sen-
tences usually begins some time before the child’s sec-
ond birthday and is largely complete by age four. In
general, comprehension precedes production.86 Verbal-
ising an opinion, however, including labelling emotions
or feelings, is much more difficult and continues to
82. Casey et al., above n. 68.
83. Ibid.
84. A. Galván, T.A. Hare, C.E. Parra, J. Penn, H. Voss, G. Glover & B.J.
Casey, ‘Earlier Development of the Accumbens Relative to Orbitofrontal
Cortex Might Underlie Risk-Taking Behavior in Adolescents’, 26 Journal
of Neuroscience 25 (2006); E.A. Crone and N. Steinbeis, ‘Neural Per-
spectives on Cognitive Control Development during Childhood and
Adolescence’, 21 Trends in Cognitive Science 205 (2017).
85. B.J. Casey and K. Caudle, ‘The Teenage Brain: Self Control’, 22 Current
Directions in Psychological Science 2 (2013); Giedd et al., above n. 74;
Mills et al., above n. 1.
86. G. Farkas and K. Beron, ‘The Detailed Age Trajectory of Roral Vocabu-
lary Knowledge: Differences by Class and Race’, 33; 464-497 Social
Science Research (2004).
develop until age ten to twelve.87 These ages are averag-
es and, again, large individual differences exist as some
children are able to verbalise an opinion at the age of
four, whereas others still might have difficulties at the
age of twelve. In addition to verbalising an opinion, this
opinion first needs to be formed. This is a complex pro-
cess of understanding information, integrating different
perspectives and arguments and organising thoughts
and feelings. Although children at the age of four can
express their view based on arguments, they conform
under the influence of peer pressure.88
Forming an opinion is also based on taking different
perspectives, that is, reasoning about others and under-
standing what they think, feel or believe.89 Studies have
shown that these ‘theory of mind’ skills develop in
infancy by the age of five years.90 In an extensive meta-
analysis of more than 170 independent studies it became
clear that the basic understanding of other peoples’
intentions and emotions is significantly developed at age
six.91 However, these skills continue to fine-tune into
the teenage years,92 paralleled by the maturation of the
‘social brain network’ (i.e. temporo-parietal junction,
superior temporal gyrus and intraparietal lobe).93
Competence is one of the skills that is important when
determining the legal position of children in civil law,
certainly, when it concerns their own legal entry. Com-
petence includes four domains – understanding, reason-
ing, valuing and making a choice – all part of executive
functioning or higher order cognitive capacities. In clini-
cal practice, extensive research has been carried out into
will competence by Irma Hein. For her dissertation, she
developed, among other things, a measuring instrument
– the MacCat-T – to objectively measure the compe-
tence of children within medical scientific research.
Hein’s research showed that, with regard to participa-
tion in medical examinations, children under age 9.6
were generally not competent, whereas children above
11.2 were, with a transition area in between.94
Brain research also shows that executive functions,
which are strongly related to the ability to make inde-
pendent decisions and to oversee the consequences of
actions, show a spectacular increase between ten and fif-
87. A. Diamond, ‘Biological and Social Influences on Cognitive Control Pro-
cesses Dependent on Prefrontal Cortex’, 189; Progression in Brain
Research 319 (2011).
88. D.B. Haun and M. Tomasello, ‘Conformity to Peer Pressure in Preschool
Children’, 82 Child Development 6 (2011).
89. V. Gallese and A. Goldman, ‘Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory
of Mind-Reading’, 2 Trends in Cognitive Science 12 (1998).
90. J. Barresi and C. Moore, ‘Intentional Relations and Social Understand-
ing’, 19; 1667, Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1996).
91. H.M. Wellman, D. Cross & J. Watson, ‘Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-
Mind Development: The Truth About False Belief’, 72 Child Develop-
ment 3 (2001).
92. S. Choudhury, S.J. Blakemore & T. Charman, ‘Social Cognitive Develop-
ment During Adolescence’, 1 Social Cognitive Affective Neuroscience 3
(2006).
93. E.A. Crone and A.J. Fuligni, ‘Self and Others in Adolescence’, Annual
Reviews of Psychology (2019; Epub ahead of print).
94. I. Hein, ‘Children’s Competence to Consent to Medical Treatment or
Research’ (PhD Thesis at VU, Amsterdam, 2015).
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teen years95 These findings are in line with those on the
cognitive development of children, which showed a
major leap again around the age of twelve, especially, in
the field of abstract reasoning.96 This means, among
other things, that children are increasingly able to think
and reason about hypothetical situations, which is nec-
essary when starting legal proceedings independently.
For younger children, not only is abstract reasoning
insufficiently developed, so that a child is unlikely to be
able to see the hypothetical consequences of a legal
procedure, the capacity to control impulses is also not
yet optimally developed. However, these are relevant
skills for initiating a (family) procedure.
Again, competence is usually determined based on cog-
nitive skills. However, next to cognitive abilities, com-
petence also entails emotional development, such as
empathy (i.e. understanding others’ emotions), or theo-
ry of mind. Interestingly, in the previous part, it was
shown that most children at the age of six already have
theory of mind skills.
Taken together, on the one hand, speaking capacity
needed for verbalising an opinion, is – on average –
developed at age four. On the other hand, higher order
cognitive functions needed for complex decision making
and overseeing future consequences of these decisions
(such as abstract reasoning, impulse control, executive
functioning) are developing into the teenage years.
These findings do not imply, however, that children
should be without locus standi in civil law proceedings
and be legally incompetent or too young to be heard in
court under the age of twelve. First, there are substan-
tial individual differences in cognitive abilities, and sec-
ond, there is no such thing as ‘pure’ cognition – an
opinion or decision is, regardless of age, affected by the
level of emotional arousal, motivation and social con-
text.97 Indeed, as the earlier mentioned imbalance model
of brain development suggests, emotional and cognitive
systems in the brain are highly connected and become
more connected with age.98
Therefore, in the next section, it will be described how
social-emotional functions develop and how these func-
tions and the (social) context can influence cognition
and decision making across late childhood and adoles-
cent development. Aspects such as reward sensitivity,
social rejection and stress will be discussed, as these are
– similar to cognitive aspects – relevant for reflections
on age limits for children’s participation in family pro-
ceedings.
3.4 Social-Emotional Functions and (Social)
Context
Social and emotional functions can be described as
95. L.M. Wierenga et al., ‘Sex Effects on Development of Brain Structure
and Executive Functions: Greater Variance than Mean Effects’, 31 Jour-
nal of Cognitive Neuroscience 730-753 (2019) afl. 5.
96. Diamond, above n. 87, at 319-339.
97. J. LeDoux, ‘The Emotional Brain: From Soul to Synapses’, 55 Biological
Psychiatry S1 (2004).
98. Van Duijvenvoorde et al., above n. 79.
the developing capacity of the child to form close and
secure adult and peer relationships; experience, regu-
late, and express emotions in socially and culturally
appropriate ways; and explore the environment and
learn – all in the context of family, community, and
culture.99
It has been reported that children from four years
onwards start to identify and articulate their own and
other people’s feelings.100 Importantly, when children’s
needs and feelings are consistently met by adults, they
are better able to develop secure relationships, regulate
their emotions and pay more attention to their sur-
roundings.101
When it comes to meeting children’s needs, this inher-
ently means taking children seriously by – for example –
hearing them in family proceedings. According to Art-
icle 12 CRC, children’s views should be given due
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the
child. From earlier studies it became clear that children
feel frustrated and powerless if they are not involved in
important decisions about their lives.102 In addition,
undermining the child’s autonomy – by not being
allowed to participate in family law proceedings or not
being heard – leads to a decrease in self-esteem.103
Additionally, it is extremely important for children to be
taken seriously: they indicate that they feel more
respected when their opinion is noticed.104 In her dis-
sertation ‘Children, Autonomy and Courts’, Daly
argues:
Urging a movement towards respect for autonomy is
likely to improve the situation of children. Autonomy
is a useful and important concept because it is always
about what one wants. It is also about insisting that
we respect others – their lived experiences, their val-
ues, their beliefs; none of which a separate individual
can ever truly understand. Autonomy should be
much more about the obligations of adults to respect
99. T. Yates, M.M. Ostrosky, G.A. Cheatham, A. Fettig, L. Shaffer & R.M.
Santos, Research Synthesis on Screening and Assessing Social-Emotion-
al Competence. Retrieved from Center on the Social Emotional Founda-
tions for Early Learning (2008), http://csefel.vanderbilt.edu/
documents/rs_screening_assessment.pdf.
100. T.G. Halle and K.E. Darling-Churchill, ‘Review of Measures of Social and
Emotional Development’, 45 Journal of Applied Developmental Psy-
chology 8-18 (2016).
101. N. Eisenberg, T.L. Spinrad & N.D. Eggum, ‘Emotion-Related Self-Regu-
lation and Its Relation to Children’s Maladjustment’, 6 Annual Review
of Clinical Psychology 495-525 (2010).
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Care in Practice’, 42 British Journal of Social Work 7 (2012); C. Leeson,
‘My Life in Care: Experiences of Non-participation in Decision-Making
Processes’, 12 Child & Family Social Work 3 (2007); K. Winter, ‘The
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(2010).
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children and individuals, and to treat their choices as
important, as it is about children’s rights claims.105
From a neuroscience perspective, it can further be sup-
ported that experiences related to gaining respect can be
very rewarding in young teenagers.106 For instance, pri-
mary rewards (such as money) in the teenage brain lead
to a strong pattern of activity in the striatum – a brain
region that processes rewarding stimuli.107 In addition
to money, there are various other forms of rewards that
affect the teenage brain, such as getting a compli-
ment,108 but possibly also experiencing autonomy.109
Research in the United States has shown that certain
interventions in high schools (aimed at a healthier life-
style or aimed at reducing bullying) work particularly
well with teenagers when their opinion is being heard
and when their sense of autonomy is increased.110 For
example, when teenagers are asked to come up with
solutions for various problems at school (such as aggres-
sion, unhealthy eating, bullying behaviour).
On the other hand, it has been found that if adults
(repeatedly) violate the sense of respect and autonomy
of young adolescents by not taking them seriously or not
hearing them, this can lead to decreased self-confidence
and self-image and behavioural problems.111 In girls,
these behavioural problems are more common in the
form of internalising behaviour, such as depression or
anxiety. In boys, behavioural problems are more often
expressed in the form of externalising behaviour, such
as aggression and problems with impulse control.112
In addition, children and adolescents who have been
repeatedly rejected, for example by peers, experience
105. A. Daly, Children, Autonomy and the Courts. Series: Stockholm Studies
in Child Law and Children’s Rights (2017), at 435.
106. L.E. Sherman, A.A. Payton, L.M. Hernandez, P.M. Greenfield &
M. Dapretto, ‘The Power of the Like in Adolescence: Effects of Peer
Influence on Neural and Behavioral Responses to Social Media’, 27 Psy-
chological Science 1027 (2016).
107. E. Schreuders, B.R. Braams, N.E. Blankenstein, J.S. Peper, B. Guroglu &
E.A. Crone, ‘Contributions of Reward Sensitivity to Ventral Striatum
Activity Across Adolescence and Early Adulthood’, 89 Child Develop-
ment 797 (2018); B.R. Braams, A.C.K. van Duijvenvoorde, J.S. Peper &
E.A. Crone, ‘Longitudinal Changes in Adolescent Risk-Taking: A Com-
prehensive Study of Neural Responses to Rewards, Pubertal Develop-
ment, and Risk-Taking Behavior’, 35 Journal of Neuroscience 7226
(2015).
108. M. Achterberg, A.C.K. Duijvenvoorde, M. van der Meulen, S. Euser,
M.J. Bakermans-Kranenburg & E.A. Crone, ‘The Neural and Behavioral
Correlates of Social Evaluation in Childhood’, 24 Developmental Cogni-
tive Neuroscience 107 (2017).
109. J. Reeve and W. Lee, ‘A Neuroscientific Perspective on Basic Psychologi-
cal Needs’, 87 Journal of Personality 102 (2019).
110. D.S. Yeager, R.E. Dahl & C.S. Dweck, ‘Why Interventions to Influence
Adolescent Behavior Often Fail but Could Succeed’, 13 Perspectives on
Psychological Science 101 (2018).
111. J.P. Allen, S.T. Hauser, K.L. Bell & T.G. O’Connor, ‘Longitudinal Assess-
ment of Autonomy and Relatedness in Adolescent-Family Interactions
as Predictors of Adolescent Ego Development and Self-esteem’, 65
Child Development 179 (1994).
112. R.D. Laird, K.Y. Jordan, K.A. Dodge, G.S. Pettit & J.E. Bates, ‘Peer
Rejection in Childhood, Involvement with Antisocial Peers in Early Ado-
lescence, and the Development of Externalizing Behavior Problems’, 13
Developmental Psychopathology 337 (2001).
mental health problems that persist into adulthood.113 A
possible mechanism that underlies the mental problems
and rejection by peers is an increased emotional and
neural reactivity in response to negative treatment, such
as being ignored or being rejected.114 For example, it
was reported that feelings of social rejection and exclu-
sion lead to a pattern of brain activity in areas that are
also involved in physical pain.115 Such effects can
already be measured in children under the age of ten.116
Thus, scientific literature suggests that taking children
seriously (e.g. by being heard or being allowed to give an
opinion, and also receiving feedback about the judge’s
decision) is highly rewarding and essential for their
well-being. In addition, brains of children react strongly
to feelings of exclusion, like being left out of (or not
being heard in) civil proceedings that directly affect the
child. The negative effects of exclusion on mental well-
being can already be demonstrated in children from ten
years onwards and might continue into adulthood. The
aforementioned findings are directly relevant to legal
practice, in which currently (young) teenagers are often
not heard or are unable to independently initiate legal
proceedings. Although children often indicate that they
want to be heard or give their opinion, this is not always
granted because of the assumption that, for example, the
child conversation is stressful and young children are
insufficiently resilient. Individual differences in stress
sensitivity and the development of the stress system in
children will now be addressed, as well as the circum-
stances that may play a reinforcing or protective role.
Initiating legal proceedings or participating in a child
conversation with a judge can be experienced as upset-
ting or can even be stressful or burdensome.117 This is
partly due to unfamiliarity with the youth assistance
system or legal practice, but also with the impact of the
decision.118
Adrenaline and cortisol are the two hormones that con-
trol the physical response to stress. Adrenaline is
released from the adrenal gland within seconds, while
cortisol acts more slowly and regulates the initial stress
113. G.W. Ladd, ’Peer Rejection, Aggressive or Withdrawn Behavior, and
Psychological Maladjustment from Ages 5 to 12: An Examination of
Four Predictive Models’, 77 Child Development 822 (2016); M.J. Prin-
stein and J.W. Aikins, ‘Cognitive Moderators of the Longitudinal Associ-
ation Between Peer Rejection and Adolescent Depressive Symptoms’,
32 Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 147 (2004).
114. G.J. Will, E.A. Crone, P.A. van Lier & B. Guroglu, ‘Neural Correlates of
Retaliatory and Prosocial Reactions to Social Exclusion: Associations
with Chronic Peer Rejection’, 19 Developmental Cognitive Neuro-
science 288 (2016).
115. Will et al., above n. 114; G.J. Will, P.A. van Lier, E.A. Crone & B. Guro-
glu, ‘Chronic Childhood Peer Rejection is Associated with Heightened
Neural Responses to Social Exclusion During Adolescence’, 44 Journal
of Abnormal Child Psychology 43 (2016).
116. E. Peters, J.M. Riksen-Walraven, A.H. Cillessen & C. de Weerth, ‘Peer
Rejection and HPA Activity in Middle Childhood: Friendship Makes a
Difference’, 82 Child Development 1906 (2011).
117. J. Cashmore and P. Parkinson, ‘Children’s Participation in Family Law
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Family Matters 15 (2009).
118. R. Nathanson and K.J. Saywitz, ‘Preparing Children for Court: Effects of
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33 Behavioral Science Law 459 (2015).
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response.119 In contrast to short-term exposure to stress,
long-term exposure to stress actually leads to a weak-
ened cortisol response,120 which may indicate reduced
resilience. Although partly determined by genetic
effects (i.e. individual differences in stress sensitivity or
resilience related to genetic differences between
people121), the environment also influences stress sensi-
tivity. Exposure to early life adversity (such as mental
and physical abuse) causes a weakened cortisol response
that persists into adulthood.122 With regard to brain
development, research has shown that (chronic) expo-
sure to stress in early childhood has adverse effects on
the development of various brain areas, including the
amygdala and hippocampus.123 These areas remained
poorer connected and were associated with poorer mem-
ory and more internalising behaviour.124
As mentioned earlier, children are sensitive to accept-
ance and rejection. For example, research has shown
that peer evaluation and exclusion have a negative effect
on the cortisol response.125 These effects have already
been demonstrated in children under ten years of age.126
There are certain child characteristics and ‘buffering/
protective’ circumstances under which this pathological
stress response can be partially restored or overcome.
For example, children who have a higher level of self-
control and better cognitive reappraisal skills (i.e. being
able to reinterpret and keep thoughts and behaviour
under control) have a more resilient cortisol response.127
In light of legal proceedings, it can be suggested that if a
child is allowed to participate in a family-related
procedure, this increases the sense of self-control, which
may possibly reduce the stress response.
Moreover, high-quality friendships during adolescence
also provide higher resilience and better mental health
later in life.128 In addition, it has recently been shown
119. J.C. Pruessner, K. Dedovic, M. Pruessner, C. Lord, C. Buss, L. Collins,
A. Dagher & S.J. Lupien, ‘Stress Regulation in the Central Nervous
System: Evidence from Structural and Functional Neuroimaging Studies
in Human Populations – 2008 Curt Richter Award Winner’, 35 Psycho-
neuroendocrinology 179 (2010).
120. Y.I. Kuras, N. Assaf, M.V. Thoma, D. Gianfarante, L. Hanlin, X. Chen,
A. Fiksdal & N. Rohleder, ‘Blunted Diurnal Cortisol Activity in Healthy
Adults with Childhood Adversity’, 11 Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
574 (2017).
121. Pruessner et al., above n. 119.
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123. P. Pervanidou and G.P. Chrousos, ‘Early-Life Stress: From Neuroendo-
crine Mechanisms to Stress-Related Disorders’, 89 Hormone Research in
Paediatrics 372 (2018).
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Development and Psychopathology 4 Pt 2 (2015).
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that thinking back to positive life experiences has a pro-
tective effect against the development of depression in
teenagers with a history of early life stress.129 Research
into the physical long-term effects of a divorce or an
out-of-home placement in alternative care (i.e. foster
care) has been carried out to a very limited extent. A
warmer bond between mother and child after a divorce
predicted a less strong cortisol response fifteen years
after the divorce.130 Only the degree of warmth as
reported by the child itself, and not as reported by the
mother, was related to the long-term stress response.
This finding is directly relevant for legal proceedings,
because it argues for hearing the child itself (instead of
one of the parents only) – as the child gave the most
accurate description of the relationship with the mother.
All in all, children are vulnerable when it comes to
exposure to stressors (such as possibly having a child
conversation or having their own legal entry). However,
certain environmental factors and child traits can help
children to better cope with stress, such as the feeling of
being in control, maintaining close friendships with
peers and being able to reinterpret and control thoughts
and behaviour. In addition, children have mixed rather
than exclusively positive or negative feelings about par-
ticipation in a court case,131 whereby the negative
aspects (i.e. stress and/or loyalty conflict) do not out-
weigh the importance of participating (i.e. being in con-
trol, being taken seriously and the wish to matter).132,133
4 Children’s Participation in
Court: Room for
Improvement?
Article 12 CRC reflects the child’s right to be provided
the opportunity to be heard in any proceedings affecting
the child.134 States parties to the CRC, such as the
‘Adolescent Friendships Predict Later Resilient Functioning Across Psy-
chosocial Domains in a Healthy Community Cohort’, 47 Psychological
Medicine 2017 (2017).
129. A.D. Askelund, S. Schweizer, I.M. Goodver & A.L. van Harmelen, ‘Posi-
tive Memory Specificity is Associated with Reduced Vulnerability to
Depression’, 3 Nature Human Behaviour 265 (2019).
130. L.J. Luecken, M.J. Hagan, S.A. Wolchik, I.N. Sandler & J.Y. Tein, ‘A
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on Cortisol Stress Response 15 Years After Parental Divorce’, 78 Psy-
chosomatic Medicine 163 (2016).
131. M. Bell, ‘Promoting Children’s Rights Through the Use of Relationship’,
7 Child & Family Social Work 1 (2002); J. Cashmore, ‘Promoting the
Participation of Children and Young People in Care’, 26 Child Abuse &
Neglect 8 (2002).
132. Cashmore and Parkinson, above n. 117; Van Bijleveld et al., above n.
104.
133. Ibid. J.S. Peper and D.J.H. Smeets, ‘Inzichten vanuit de pedagogische
wetenschappen en de neuropsychologie’, in M.R. Bruning et al., Kind in
proces: van communicatie naar effectieve participatie, Meijers-reeks nr.
335 (2020).
134. In this article, we have not discussed how the child should preferably be
heard – directly or through a representative or an appropriate body.
Nevertheless, our research findings clearly indicate that directly hearing
the child in court proceedings is preferable from the point of view of
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Netherlands, are given much leeway in how to imple-
ment this children’s right and whether or not to use age
limits as a means to define which children should be
deemed capable of forming their own views. Still, the
CRC Committee discourages states parties from
introducing age limits in either law or practice that
would restrict the child’s right to be heard. The CRC
Committee emphasises that children’s capability to
express their own views should be determined on a case-
by-case basis and this requires an individual assessment
of each individual child. When age limits are used, this
should not be an absolute impediment and should not
hinder younger children who are capable of forming
their views from being heard. The CRC and the CRC
Committee have not taken a stand on whether children
should have locus standi in legal proceedings and be able
to, independently of their legal guardians, initiate legal
proceedings or file an appeal.
In the Netherlands, age limits in civil law proceedings
are common ground, both regarding the right to be invi-
ted to be heard in court and the right to initiate pro-
ceedings. As mentioned earlier, children are deemed to
be legally incompetent in civil law proceedings, but
many exceptions to this rule were introduced in Dutch
legislation in the past few decades – without a common
approach to children’s procedural rights in civil law –
and this has led to a complicated, fragmented civil law
system. Nevertheless, in Dutch criminal law and admin-
istrative law, other perspectives are found regarding the
child’s procedural rights. In administrative law, the
child’s capability to express his or her own views is
assessed on an individual basis, and in criminal law,
child suspects have a stronger procedural position. It,
therefore, seems that these legal contexts envisage
diverse child images with differing considerations of the
child’s evolving capacities and competency. Several
research reports about the child’s procedural position in
family law of the past few decades have instigated par-
liamentary discussions about improving the child’s posi-
tion, but, time and again, from the perspective of the
Dutch legislator it was stressed that children should be
represented by their parents or other legal guardians
and when this is impossible due to a serious conflict of
interests, the court can appoint a guardian ad litem for
the child. In civil law, no law amendments were deemed
necessary to give children locus standi or lower age lim-
its, for example, the age limit of twelve years of age for
being invited to be heard in court in family proceedings.
In this article, we have presented relevant neuropsycho-
logical insights that can enrich reflections upon current
age limits and possible improvements, not only for
Dutch civil (family) law, but also for any country using
age limits in legislation for children’s procedural posi-
tion. We have stated that adolescence starts with the
onset of puberty, a hormonal process that is related to
brain development and emotional processing, and
already starts – on average – at age eight in girls and
both Dutch youngsters and Dutch family and children’s judges; see
Bruning et al., above n. 35, at 205-208.
nine in boys. It is important to recognise that these
developmental effects are initiated way before the age of
twelve. To obtain realistic predictions about the cogni-
tive (and social-emotional) capacities needed to weigh
different arguments, form an opinion, make a decision
and oversee the consequences of that decision, it is
important to be aware of the general developmental pat-
terns of the underlying neuronal systems of children.
The development of understanding and producing com-
plex sentences usually begins some time before the
child’s second birthday and is largely complete by age
four. Studies have shown that ‘theory of mind’ skills
develop in infancy by the age of five to six years but
continue to fine-tune into the teenage years. These find-
ings imply that the age limit of twelve years to invite
children to be heard in court in family law proceedings
is no longer tenable. However, it is important to note
that there are substantial individual differences in cogni-
tive abilities and that there is no such thing as ‘pure’
cognition: an opinion or decision is – regardless of age –
affected by the level of emotional arousal, motivation
and social context.
Emotional processes and social context can influence
cognitive functioning and decision making across ado-
lescent development. From a neuropsychological per-
spective, the concepts of autonomy and well-being,
resistance to pressure and stress are relevant for a fur-
ther reflection on age limits. As mentioned earlier,
research findings show that rewards are a strong motiva-
tional incentive for (young) teenagers; having a free
choice or the feeling of being able to exert control over
decisions makes the brain more resilient in negative set-
tings and possibly also increases performance. On the
other hand, if adults violate the sense of respect and
autonomy of young adolescents by not taking them seri-
ously, this can lead to decreased self-esteem and self-
image and behavioural problems. This implies that tak-
ing children seriously by being heard in court is highly
rewarding and essential for their well-being. In addition,
brains of children react strongly to feelings of exclusion,
like not being heard in civil proceedings that directly
affect the child. Most children indicate that they want to
be heard by a judge,135 but nevertheless children under
the age of twelve years are hardly ever heard in Dutch
family law proceedings. This often seems to be based on
the assumption that child hearings in court are stressful
and that young children are insufficiently resilient.
Scientific research shows that children are indeed vul-
nerable when it comes to exposure to stressors, such as a
child hearing in court. However, certain environmental
factors and child traits can help children to better cope
with stress, such as the feeling of being in control, main-
taining close friendships with peers and being able to
reinterpret and control thoughts and behaviour. In addi-
tion, children have mixed rather than exclusively posi-
tive or negative feelings about participation in court
proceedings, whereby the negative aspects do not out-
weigh the importance of participating. It is, therefore,
135. Bruning et al., above n. 35, at 175.
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evident that even though participation in family law
proceedings will lead to stress for children, this is no
excuse to not let them participate in court, and protec-
tive factors are important for children to better cope
with stress.
Overall, it should be noted that models of brain devel-
opment do not – and cannot – specify at which age a
child is fully capable of independent decision making or
forming an authentic opinion. First, these complex cog-
nitive processes are hard to measure using a task suitable
for MRI. Second, there are many individual differences
between children, and studies on brain development
merely provide insights into average patterns of devel-
opment across large samples. Third, besides biological
factors like the brain, environmental factors, or social
context, influence (cognitive) functioning. For instance,
under emotionally arousing situations, adolescents may
be more prone to be influenced by affective states,
whereas under emotionally calm situations, they are
more prone to make cognitively driven choices.136
In conclusion, what can we learn from these neuropsy-
chological insights in light of age limits for children in
civil law? There are no easy answers to this question.
Neuropsychological insights reveal that an age limit of
twelve years for children to be heard in court is not only
arbitrary, but also unnecessarily restrains children’s
right to be heard in proceedings to an extent that is not
legitimate. Children younger than twelve years of age
are also competent and with a child-friendly system,
including support factors, can be considered capable of
forming their own views. Besides their capacities or
competency to form and express their own views, taking
children seriously in the courtroom is highly rewarding
and essential for the child’s well-being and can help
avoid feelings of exclusion that lead to damage for the
child.
With regard to the child’s procedural position to initiate
proceedings and file and appeal as an autonomous party
to the proceedings, one could wonder if the neuropsy-
chological insights that were presented in part 3 also
lead to the conclusion that children should have locus
standi and be given the right to autonomous party status.
We are more reluctant to conclude likewise, since
expressing one’s voice when being heard in court and
independently initiating family proceedings seem to dif-
fer with regard to the impact of decision for the child.
We recommend further research from a multidisciplina-
ry perspective.
When considering the right to be heard, we are confi-
dent that the current age limit in Dutch civil law should
be lowered. From a neuropsychological perspective, the
best option would be to individually assess each individ-
ual child and determine his or her competency on a
case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, using age limits has
the advantage of a clear system in which the judiciary
does not have the burden to organise a system for indi-
136. L.H. Somerville and B.J. Casey, ‘Developmental Neurobiology of Cogni-
tive Control and Motivational Systems’, 20 Current Opinion in Neuro-
biology 2 (2010).
vidual assessments, but can focus on inviting all chil-
dren from a certain age to be heard in court. As long as
an age limit gives room to include children under the
age limit who are competent and wish to be heard, age
limits are permitted. We, therefore, recommend from a
legal perspective that the Dutch age limit for hearing
children in court in family proceedings should be low-
ered to at least eight years. With regard to other age lim-
its in Dutch civil law that were mentioned earlier, a
thorough review is necessary in order to decide about
the child’s possibilities to independently start proceed-
ings or file a complaint in cases of separation, divorce
and custody and in cases of child protection and out-of-
home placement. This includes a thorough reflection on
possible forms of support or (legal) representation in
court for children, who now hardly ever have any possi-
bilities to be legally represented in family law proceed-
ings.
We hope to have clarified that scientific collaboration
between the disciplines of law and neuropsychology is
fruitful and crucial when children who experience legal
proceedings are concerned. The legislature can no
longer deny scientific neuropsychological insights and
will have to embrace collaboration with social sciences.
Nevertheless, neuropsychological findings will not offer
any clear blueprint for new legislation regarding chil-
dren in legal proceedings nor give a clear answer to legal
questions about how to define certain groups of chil-
dren, since every child is different and needs to be
approached as an individual with specific characteris-
tics. It is not always possible to bridge the gap between
various disciplines. Still, it is worthwhile getting to
know each other and trying to build the contours of a
bridge. There is still much to learn and much to be
gained when reflecting upon children in court proceed-
ings. Striving to effectively implement Article 12 CRC
in order to better hear children themselves in court pro-
ceedings should involve further multidisciplinary scien-
tific collaboration and integration of scientific findings
across multiple domains.
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